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MISUNDERESTIMATING DASTAR: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT UNWITTINGLY REVOLUTIONIZED
COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
TOM W. BELL*
ABSTRACT
Courts and commentators have misunderstood, and conse-
quently underestimated, the recent Supreme Court case of Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. Voicing concern
that once a copyrighted work has fallen into the public domain it
should stay there, the Dastar Court held that authors of such works
cannot use federal unfair competition law to force copiers to give
them credit. The Court guaranteed that result by stipulating that
"origin" in § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act does not refer to the
source of an idea, concept, or communication. That holding barred
a reverse passing off claim brought under § 43(a) against Dastar
Corp. for its having sold videotapes without crediting the plaintiffs
as the origin offormerly copyrighted material included on those tapes.
Because lower courts have focused on the legal means employed by the
Dastar Court, however, rather than its evident policy goals, they
have extended it to facts materially different from those at issue in the
case. Courts have applied the case to bar Lanham Act claims
against the unauthorized use of copyrighted, uncopyrightable, and
trade secret-protected goods. Courts have stretched it to cover services,
too. Most significantly, in a move that effectively doubles Dastar's
reach, courts have even begun applying the case to bar unfair compe-
tition claims brought under state law. Although they do not appar-
ently realize it, courts relying on Dastar to preempt state unfair
competition claims have signaled a revolution in copyright law.
Ever since the enactment of Copyright Act § 301(a) nearly thirty
years ago, the express terms of that section have monopolized copy-
right preemption doctrine. But § 301(a) cannot explain or justify
Dastar's evident power to preempt state unfair competition claims.
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. I thank for commenting on
draft versions of this Article: Dan Burk, Justin Hughes, Michael Greg Lastowka, Mark Lem-
ley, Thomas Nachbar, Malla Pollack, Parham Williams, and participants in the 2005 Intellec-
tual Property Scholars Conference. I thank Gregory Newman and Lauren Fisher for
proofreading and research assistance. I take sole responsibility for the Article as submitted
for publication.
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Intentionally or not, the Dastar Court has revived the long-mori-
bund and somewhat ill-defined doctrine of implied copyright preemp-
tion. Here, even more than with regard to unfair competition,
Dastar's consequences look likely to far outreach the Court's original,
modest aims. We have surely misunderestimated Dastar 's impact on
unfair competition law. With regard to copyright law, however, we
may still have time to understand and estimate Dastar's ultimate
ramifications.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.' has suffered from a misunderstanding. When it first is-
sued, especially, many people took the case at face value. They as-
sumed that Dastar meant what it said and, therefore, that it did little
more than interpret the Lanham Act to exclude reverse passing off
claims premised on misrepresentations about the source of un-
copyrighted works. In other words, Dastar meant simply that you
1. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
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would not face a federal lawsuit for claiming authorship of a formerly
copyrighted work that nobody now owns.
It soon became apparent, however, that Dastar meant something
else altogether. Lower courts applying the case focused not on the
aims that explained its holding, but rather on the specific mechanism
through which the Dastar Court had tried to achieve those aims: By
having stipulated that "origin" in § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act2
does not mean the source of any idea, concept, or communication.3
When read as a case amending § 43(a), Dastarapplies notjust to once-
copyrighted works that have fallen into the public domain, but to
copyrighted, uncopyrightable, and trade secret-protected works, too.
The case also applies not just to goods embodying those works, but
also to services. It may well soon reach patentable subject matter, too.
As judicial decisions (if not necessarily judicial opinions) have now
begun to apply the case, moreover, Dastar covers both federal and
state unfair competition claims. That latter move effectively doubles
Dastar's already expansive application. Nobody-including, notably,
the Supreme Court-seems to have predicted that Dastar would have
such far-reaching effects on the law of unfair competition.
Dastar promises to have an even more surprising and extensive
impact, however, on copyright law. Although courts and commenta-
tors have yet to notice it, Dastar signals a revolution in copyright law's
power to preempt state laws. As with regard to the effect the case has
already had on unfair competition law, it is not at all evident that the
Court wanted Dastar to open new-or, more accurately, to reopen for-
gotten-vistas in copyright preemption. For nearly thirty years, copy-
right law has relied almost entirely on the preemption rules expressly
set forth in § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act.4 Now, suddenly, Dastar has
revivified the long-moribund and somewhat ill-defined doctrine of im-
plied copyright preemption.
With regard to copyright preemption even more than with regard
to unfair competition, Dastar's ultimate and extraordinary conse-
quences look likely to far outreach the Court's original, modest aims.
How was the case so sorely underestimated? Because it was so sorely
misunderstood. Dastar has been, in a word, misunderestimated.
I describe Dastar as misunderestimated advisedly. After President
George W. Bush used that word in a number of public statements,
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
3. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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some mocked it as an all-too characteristic slip of the tongue.5 But
U.S. presidents have a long and honored history of crafting neolo-
gisms. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, gets credit for originating over
sixty words, including authentication, countervailing, doll-baby, public rela-
tions, and (less famously) vomit grass.6 Teddy Roosevelt coined lunatic
fringe and gave muckraker its current, primary meaning.7 Why not like-
wise credit President Bush for a new and useful word? At all events,
let us not abandon misunderestimate to the jibes of political satirists.
What word better combines, in one neat bundle, the distinct but re-
lated ideas of misunderstanding and underestimation? She who mis-
underestimates fails both to fully comprehend her subject and,
consequently, to fully predict its ramifications.' That, in a very apt
word, perfectly describes how courts and commentators have inter-
preted Dastar.
If, notwithstanding that plea on behalf of misunderestimate, you
still find it hard to take the word seriously, so much the better. The
word's somewhat comical implications suit Dastar, too. Singularly pe-
culiar facts drove the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case, facts
that have yet to recur in any lower court. Nonetheless, that has not
prevented lower courts from using Dastar to significantly change the
scope of unfair competition and copyright law. They do not thereby
take liberties with Dastar, the plain language of the case obviously sup-
ports, and arguably even mandates, its application to facts far different
than those before the Supreme Court. Still, we might very well won-
der whether the Supreme Court really wanted that result. It looks very
much as if the Court said far more than it meant to say precisely be-
cause it aimed only to cast a moderate interpretive gloss on § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. Just as legislators sometimes choose statutory lan-
guage that wreaks unintended consequences, however, the Supreme
Court's clarification of the Lanham Act has reshaped federal and state
unfair competition law and presaged a revolution in copyright law.
5. See, e.g., Snopes.com, Make the Pie Higher!, http://www.snopes.com/politics/
bush/piehigher.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2005) (including the word in a poem constructed
entirely of Bush misstatements and documenting the word's origin).
6. David G. Post, "The Free Use of Our Faculties: Thomas Jefferson, Cyberspace, and the
Language of Social Life, 49 DRA.KE L. Rav. 407, 418 n.48 (2001).
7. Michael Quinion, Presidential Voices, WORLD WIDE WORDS, July 31, 2004, http://
www.worldwidewords.org/reviews/re-pre2.htm (book review).
8. So, at least, I define the word. Since so few people take the word seriously, few
disagree with my definition. But see Langmaker.com, Misunderestimate (adj.), http://
www.langmaker.com/db/eng-misunderestimate.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2005) (defining
the word as "[tio be excessively underestimated to the point of being ignored or ridi-
culed"). Since that source evidently cannot distinguish a verb from an adjective, however,
it merits little regard.
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Part I discusses what Dastar says by comparing the case itself with
its reception in lower courts and in academic commentary. As that
comparison demonstrates, Dastar has already displayed a tendency to
have far greater effects than anyone at first expected. Part II explains
how Dastar stands ready to surprise us yet again, this time in the area
of copyright preemption doctrine. Does that prediction err by mis-
characterizing the extant scope of preemption under § 301(a)? Part
III carefully considers and rejects that critique. Part IV thus ventures a
few predictions about what will result if, as seems likely, Dastar resur-
rects implied copyright preemption. The conclusion offers a brief re-
view set amidst the customary rhetorical flourishes.
I. WHAT DASTAR AND ITS PROGENY SAY: COPYRIGHT LIMITS
FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
This Part contrasts the meaning of Dastar with what lower courts
and commentators take the case to say. As Section A describes, the
Dastar Court argued from a variety of broad policy concerns to a nar-
row conclusion about the meaning of a single word in § 43(a) (1) (A)
of the Lanham Act. As Section B describes, lower courts have focused
on that latter aspect of Dastar, reading the case to have effectively
amended § 43(a) (1) (A) in all its applications. In so doing, lower
courts have expanded Dastar's reach far beyond what the Supreme
Court's policy concerns mandated or even suggested. Section C
surveys what commentators have said about Dastar, revealing that they
have said little about its late-breaking expansion in lower courts and
nothing about the preemption issues the case raises, a topic consid-
ered in Part I of this Article.
A. Dastar Itself
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,9 the Supreme
Court addressed whether § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act affords a
claim against the reverse passing off of a once-copyrighted film that
has fallen into the public domain. The plain language of that section
puts anyone using in commerce a mark that "is likely to cause confu-
sion ... as to the origin... of his or her goods" at risk of civil liability
for unfair competition.10 The Dastar Court held, however, that "ori-
gin" in § 43(a) (1) (A) refers solely to "the producer of the tangible
product sold in the marketplace" 11-not to "the person or entity that
9. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
11. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
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originated the ideas or communications that 'goods' embody or con-
tain." 2 Under that interpretation of the statute, the defendant in Das-
tar could incur no liability under § 43(a) for having engaged in the
reverse passing off-i.e., having sold under its own name-goods con-
taining once-copyrighted works created by another party.
1 3
To understand how Dastar reached that conclusion, it helps to
consider the case's own origins. In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower completed writing Crusade in Europe, his account of the World
War II Allies' European campaign.14 Doubleday obtained the copy-
right to the book and granted an affiliate of plaintiff Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corporation (Fox) the exclusive rights to produce a
television series based on that work. 5 Fox arranged for the produc-
tion of that television series, also called Crusade in Europe, and ob-
tained the copyright thereto. 6 Though Doubleday renewed its book
copyright in 1975, Fox neglected to renew its copyright in the televi-
sion series. 17 The television series consequently fell into the public
domain. 18
In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights in Eisenhower's
book and sublicensed to plaintiffs SFM Entertainment and New Line
Home Video, Inc. the exclusive rights to distribute videos of Crusade in
Europe. 9 Defendant Dastar decided to compete in the same market.
20
It purchased copies of the original version of the Crusade in Europe
video-the one that had fallen into the public domain.2' Dastar then
copied the video, edited it by excising some old and adding some new
material, and created new packaging. 22 In 1995, it began selling the
resulting video set under the name Campaigns in Europe.2 - Dastar mar-
keted Campaigns in Europe only under its own marks; its advertising
and screen credits made no reference to the original Crusade in Europe
12. Id. at 32.
13. The Court expressly left open the possibility that a defendant like Dastar might,
upon the proof of additional facts, face liability for deceptive marketing under Lanham Act
§ 43(a) (1) (B). Id. at 38. That would not equate to reverse passing off, however.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 25-26.
17. Id. at 26.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 26-27.
23. Id. at 26.
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television series, the videotapes that Fox authorized others to dis-
tribute, or Eisenhower's book.24
In 1998, chagrined that Dastar was selling Campaigns in Europe at
half the price of Crusade in Europe, Fox and its sublicensees brought
suit alleging that Dastar's video set infringed on Doubleday's copy-
right in the book and, thus, the exclusive television rights that
Doubleday had granted them.25 They later added claims that by mar-
keting Campaigns in Europe without giving proper credit to the Crusade
in Europe television series Dastar had engaged in reverse passing off 6
in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and California unfair com-
petition laws.27
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found
for Dastar on all three counts.2" The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the judgment for Dastar on the
Lanham Act claim, reversed the judgment on the copyright claim, and
said nothing about the state law unfair competition claim.29 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.30 With eight Justices deliberating
(Justice Breyer took no part in the proceedings) the Court issued a
unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, reversing the Ninth
Circuit's resolution of the Lanham Act claim and remanding the case
for further proceedings."'
Although the Supreme Court presented its holding as a simple
matter of interpreting the language of § 43(a),32 policy considerations
quite evidently swayed the Court's deliberations. Foremost among
those considerations, the Court worried that giving the Lanham Act
too broad a scope would put it into conflict with the Copyright Act.33
After describing how the Lanham Act aims to protect consumers from
24. Id. at 27.
25. Id.
26. The Supreme Court explained, "Passing off (or palming off, as it is sometimes
called) occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else's.
Reverse passing off, as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents
someone else's goods or services as his own." Id. at 27 n.1 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
27. Id. at 27.
28. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-7189, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22064, at *36 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000).
29. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't Distrib., 34 F.App'x 312, 314-15 (9th
Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision).
30. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S. 1099 (2003).
31. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38.
32. See id. at 31 ("At bottom, we must decide what § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act
means by the 'origin' of 'goods.'").
33. Id, at 33.
[VOL-. 65:206
MISUNDERESTIMATING DASTAR
harmful misrepresentations of origin,34 for instance, and admitting
that "[t]he purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in
the identity of the producer of the physical tome (the publisher), but
also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it
conveys (the author),"35 the Court nonetheless refused to read "origin
... of . . . goods" in § 43(a) (1) (A) so as to allow a cause of action
against the reverse passing off of the content of communicative goods.
Why? "[A]ccording special treatment to communicative products,"
the Court explained, would cause "the Lanham Act to conflict with
the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically."3 6
The Court related how it had in many instances taken pains to
ensure that patentable subject matter did not receive greater protec-
tions than those afforded by the Patent Act,37 citing TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,38 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc.," Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.4° (but, surprisingly, not its com-
panion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.4 1), and Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co.42 That wind-up prepared the Court for its pitch
on behalf of defending the integrity of copyright policy:
Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representa-
tion of itself as the "Producer" of its videos amounted to a
representation that it originated the creative work conveyed
by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43 (a) for
that representation would create a species of mutant copy-
right law that limits the public's "federal right to 'copy and to
use' expired copyrights.43
The Court then turned to other considerations from policy and
precedent that, while worthy of study, do not prove especially perti-
nent here." The evident worry that federal unfair competition law
might conflict with copyright law arguably exercised a more powerful
influence on the Court than those other considerations did. The dis-
34. Id. at 32-33.
35. Id. at 33.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 33-34.
38. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
39. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
40. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
41. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
42. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
43. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
44. See, e.g., id. at 34-35 (citing § 106A of the Copyright Act as the sole protection of
authors' attribution rights federal lawmakers intended), 35-36 (citing awkward practical
problems that would follow from giving § 43(a)(1)(A) a broader meaning), 36-37 (citing
related precedents that a contrary holding would put in doubt).
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cussion about the need to avoid a conflict between the Lanham Act
and the Copyright Act certainly came before, and ran longer than, the
Court's other policy discussions.4 5 More to the point, Dastar's anxiety
about the prospect of "a species of mutant copyright law" shows the
Court engaging in what we might call "intra-federal preemption."4 6
As argued later in this Article,4 7 that reasoning effectively mandates
that courts preempt state law reverse passing off claims similar to the
Lanham Act claim struck down in Dastar. Indeed, as argued in the
next Section, courts have already begun to fulfill that mandate.
B. Dastar in the Courts
Lower courts have consciously expanded the reach of Dastar in a
variety of ways. Most notably, they have read it to bar § 43(a) reverse
passing off claims arising out of the unauthorized use of copyrighted
works.4 8 That expansion has won almost universal support in the case
law. Lower courts have also expanded Dastar by reading it to bar re-
verse passing off claims arising out of the use of uncopyrightable ideas
and trade secrets (rather than just uncopyrighted works) and by read-
ing it to speak to communicative services (rather than just communi-
cative goods)." Although those expansions have won considerably
less support in the case law, they provide further evidence that Dastar
has had a bigger impact than anyone-including, in all likelihood, the
Supreme Court itself-initially would have predicted. Lower courts
have expanded Dastar's reach in yet another, still more remarkable
way: By relying on the case to preempt state law reverse passing off
claims arising out of the unauthorized use of copyrighted works.50
Surprisingly, lower courts have adopted that fourth reading of Dastar
without any evident consciousness that in so doing they have opened
the door to a revolution in copyright's preemption doctrine. Subsec-
tions 1 through 4 discuss, in turn, each of those four ways in which
lower courts have expanded Dastais reach.
1. Expanding Dastar to Copyrighted Works.-Almost every time a
lower court has cited Dastar in barring a Lanham Act reverse passing
off claim, that claim has arisen from the unauthorized reuse of copy-
righted works. In thus applying Dastar, those lower courts have ex-
45. Id. at 33.
46. Id. at 34.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See infra Part I.B.1.
49. See infra Parts I.B.2-3.
50. See infra Part I.B.4.
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panded the case's holding well beyond its facts. The claim at issue in
Dastar, recall, did not arise out of the reuse of a copyright-protected
work.5
Incredibly, no lower court has yet to apply Dastar to claims arising
out of reuse of a work having precisely the same copyright status as the
work at issue in that case: A once-copyrighted work that had fallen
into the public domain.52 One or more courts have applied Dastar to
bar reverse passing off claims under Lanham Act § 43(a) relating to
the reuse of uncopyrightable (as opposed to noncopyrighted) works.53 Of
more interest for present purposes, many more cases have applied
Dastar to bar Lanham Act claims against the reverse passing off of copy-
righted works. Those nine cases, all from federal courts, come from
the First Circuit,54 Fifth Circuit,5 5 and district courts across the coun-
try.56 No court to date has declined to follow that long line of cases by
limiting Dastas effect to reverse passing off claims involving only un-
copyrighted works. In sum, then, judicial authorities agree that Dastar
limits Lanham Act reverse passing off claims arising out of the unau-
thorized use of copyrighted as well as uncopyrighted works.
In retrospect, it should cause no great surprise that lower courts
have expanded Dastar to cover copyrighted works. 57 Recall that the
51. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (noting that the copyright had expired).
52. See id.
53. For discussion of those cases, and an argument that they expanded the types of
intellectual property covered by Dastar, see infra Part I.B.2.
54. See Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251-52 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying Dastar to pre-
empt a Lanham Act claim based on credit given for a copyrighted textbook).
55. See Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 148-49 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying
Dastar to preempt a Lanham Act claim based on reverse passing off of copyrighted
software).
56. See Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(applying Dastar to preempt a Lanham Act claim based on reverse passing off of copy-
righted architectural plans); Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d
876, 878-80 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (copyrighted software); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1116-17 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (copyrighted images); Smith v. New Line
Cinema, No. 03 Civ. 5274, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18382, at *10-*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004)
(copyrighted screenplay); Boston Int'l Music, Inc. v. Austin, No. 02-12148-GAO, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003) (copyrighted music); Carroll v. Kahn,
No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17902, at *15-*18 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003) (copy-
righted film); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183-85 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (copyrighted film).
57. For an argument that the Dastar Court should have foreseen this outcome, and
crafted an opinion better designed to deal with it, see Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and
Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1473, 1527 (2004) (complaining that the Dastar Court "obviously did not view overlap-
ping copyright and trademark protection as part of a single, overarching issue or interre-
lated set of problems. As a result, the Court did not provide a solution to that interrelated
set of problems and instead issued an incomplete and unsatisfactory result").
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Dastar court claimed to have found the proper meaning of "origin of
goods" as used in § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act, explaining that
"the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are of-
fered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or commu-
nication embodied in those goods."58 The Court did not expressly
limit that reading to cases involving works of authorship in public do-
main. Nor could the rhetoric of Dastar have easily admitted that ex-
ception. Granted, the Court cited policy considerations and appears
in fact to have been motivated by concerns that unfair competition
law might conflict with copyright law.59 Nonetheless, in an apparent
attempt at judicial modesty, the Court hid its policy concerns behind
the fig leaf of statutory interpretation.
The Dastar Court thus effectively amended the Lanham Act,
changing its meaning for any and all applications. Indeed, lower
courts largely appear to have not even noticed that they have ex-
panded Dastar to cover copyright-protected works. The exceptional
court, Williams v. UMG Recordings,6° confronted the defendants' claim
that Dastar applies only to uncopyrighted works with a summary
counterargument: "To the contrary, the Supreme Court's holding did
not depend on whether the works were copyrighted or not."" Per-
haps that goes a bit far. A fair reading of Dastar shows that the un-
copyrighted status of the works at issue in the case did trigger the
Court's policy concerns. Nonetheless, regardless of the reasoning be-
hind it, lower courts quite understandably take Dastar's holding to dic-
tate the meaning of "origin" in § 43(a) (1) (A) as a general matter,
regardless of its application.
58. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
59. See id. at 33 (claiming that to allow reverse passing off claims against those who
market copies of uncopyrighted works would "cause[ ] the Lanham Act to conflict with the
law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically"), 34 (worrying that such a cause
of action would "create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's federal
right to copy and to use, expired copyrights") (internal quotation marks omitted), 34-35
(describing the sharply limited rights in § 106A of the Copyright Act and arguing, "Recog-
nizing in § 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted
works (visual or otherwise) would render these limitations superfluous"), 37 (explaining
that the Court's interpretive gloss aimed to prevent the Lanham Act from creating "a spe-
cies of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do").
60. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
61. Id. at 1185. The court did offer a bit more to the argument; the quotation contin-
ues: "Rather, in being careful not to extend trademark protections, the Court noted that
protection for communicative products was available through copyright claims. In fact, this
protection would only be available if a valid copyright existed." Id. The Williams court
surely erred, however, in claiming that Dastar conditioned its analysis on a valid copyright
subsisting, or even having subsisted, in the communicative products at issue. Rather, the
Court plainly focused on whether copyright protection was available. SeeDastar, 539 U.S. at
37-38 (discussing ways the defendants could have won copyright rights).
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2. Expanding Dastar to Other Intellectual Properties.-Held strictly
to its facts, Dastarspeaks only of the permissibility of claims against the
reverse passing off of fixed works of authorship-i.e., copyrightable (if
not necessarily copyrighted) intellectual property.6 2 It has, however,
been extended to bar complaints about the reverse passing off of
other types of intellectual property-i.e., uncopyrightable facts and
trade secrets. Judging from the plain language of the case, courts will
almost certainly also soon extend Dastar to cover subject matter within
the scope of patent law. This Subsection discusses each topic in turn.
a. Uncopyrightable Works.-It might at first appear unduly pe-
dantic to claim that Dastar does not speak of uncopyrightable subject
matter. The opinion does, after all, show evident concern about pre-
serving the public domain from overbroad claims of unfair competi-
tion.6" But no less a personage than Judge Richard A. Posner has
claimed (in a law review article rather than a judicial opinion) that
Dastar applies only "in cases in which what is palmed off is expressive
material."64 To read it as applicable to uncopyrightable material
more generally would, he explains, put in doubt the venerable hold-
ing of International News Service v. Associated Press,65 which affirmed an
injunction on (arguably) the reverse passing off of uncopyrightable
facts.6 6 Nonetheless, one or more courts have, rightly or wrongly, ex-
panded Dastar to bar § 43(a) reverse passing off claims relating to the
reuse of uncopyrightable (as opposed to uncopyrighted) works.
The "or more" hedge reflects uncertainty about the copyright sta-
tus of the works at issue in two of those cases. Keane v. Fox Televisions
Stations, Inc.,6 7 clearly involved an uncopyrightable work. Although
the plaintiff in Keane initially asserted a copyright in his idea for an
American Idol-style television show, he later amended his pleadings to
drop that claim.68 He apparently recognized, as did the court, that
"copyright law does not protect ideas but only the expression of
ideas."69 Citing Dastar, the Keane court dismissed the plaintiffs Lan-
62. See supra Part I.B.1.
63. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
64. Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. Rv. 621, 639 (2003).
65. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
66. See Posner, supra note 64, at 639 (describing with approval the characterization of
the facts set forth in Justice Holmes' dissent). I use "(arguably)" in recognition that the
source of that characterization, coming as it does from a dissent, might raise suspicion. See
Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 247-48 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing the facts of the
case).
67. 297 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
68. Id. at 929.
69. Id. at 935 n.75.
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ham Act claim on grounds, in relevant part, that § 43(a) does not for-
bid the reverse passing off of mere ideas."y
Keane thus quite plainly showed a court applying Dastar to dismiss
a reverse passing off claim under Lanham Act § 43(a) relating to re-
use of uncopyrightable ideas or concepts.7y Perhaps the court in
Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc.,7 2 did likewise; the
case's language leaves it unclear whether or not the works in question
were copyrightable. y3 Although the plaintiff clearly alleged that the
defendants had "photos and other property belonging to [plain-
tiff] ,,,Y the court said, "Plaintiff is essentially claiming that defendants
took plaintiffs uncopyrighted and unpatented ideas and concepts
.... "75 Similar uncertainty clouds the holding of Bretford Manufactur-
ing, Inc. v. Smith System Manufacturing Co.,76 which read Dastar to bar a
Lanham Act reverse passing off claim where the defendant had used a
leg from one of the plaintiff's tables to prepare a sample table, which
the defendant then used to win a contract for building similar tables
in quantity. Was plaintiffs table leg copyrighted? Probably not. Al-
though the Bretford court did not speak to the issue, furniture designs
generally constitute useful articles not subject to copyright protec-
tion.7 7 Also, the fact that the defendant evidently made numerous
copies of the plaintiffs table leg without suffering a copyright in-
fringement claim-but instead only a reverse passing off claim-
strongly suggests that no such copyright existed.78
At any rate, courts apparently have few qualms about extending
Dasta?'s coverage from uncopyrighted works to uncopyrightable ones.
Certainly, no court has yet to reject an appeal to Dastar based on that
distinction. Does that expansion of Dastar make sense? Many of the
70. Id. at 935.
71. Id.
72. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Kan. 2004).
73. See id. at 1123-24.
74. Id. at 1123.
75. Id. at 1126.
76. 286 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (limiting the definition of copyrightable sculptural
works to "their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects" and explaining that
the design of any useful article will qualify as sculpture "only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article"); Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsdale House Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455
(M.D.N.C. 2003) (describing plaintiffs furniture as "useful articles; that is, they have 'an
intrinsic utilitarian function,' 17 U.S.C. § 101, and are presumptively uncopyrightable").
78. See Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (detailing plaintiffs complaints without making any mention of a copyright infringe-
ment claim).
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same policy concerns that inspired the Supreme Court's decision re-
garding uncopyrighted works also apply to uncopyrightable ones. Not
all do, however. Note, for instance, that the Supreme Court justified
its refusal to grant the Dastar plaintiffs protection from reverse copy-
ing in part because they could have availed themselves of copyright
protection.79 The same hardly holds true of plaintiffs asserting claims
for the reverse passing off of their uncopyrightable ideas or facts. Fur-
thermore, as Judge Posner observed, expanding Dastar to cover un-
copyrightable facts threatens to bring it into conflict with well-
established precedents upholding the misappropriation cause of
action.80
b. Trade Secrets.-Does Dastar bar reverse passing off claims
premised on the unauthorized use of trade secrets? One authority,
the court in Tao of Systems Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Services & Materi-
als, Inc.," l appears to have answered that question yes. Plaintiff Tao
complained that defendant AS&M's winning proposal to sell engi-
neering services to NASA incorporated Tao's trade secrets, misrepre-
senting AS&M's services and confusing NASA to Tao's detriment.8 2
The Tao court dismissed the § 43(a) (1) (A) claim that plaintiff based
on those allegations.8 3 As the court explained, the plaintiff claimed
that AS&M's proposal "incorporated ideas or concepts that belonged
to Tao. This, however, is precisely the type of allegation which the
Supreme Court rejected as the basis for a reverse-passing-off claim in
Dastar.''s4 With the Tao court's expansion of Dastar to cover trade
secrets, as with other courts' expansion of Dastar to cover copyrighted
works,8 5 we see how the policy considerations that evidently drove the
Dastar Court matter far less to lower courts than the Court's gloss on
the language of § 43(a) (1) (A).
c. Subject Matter Within the Scope of Patent Law.-Thus far, no
court appears to have had occasion to apply Dastar to bar a complaint
about the reverse passing off of subject matter within the scope of
patent law. That scenario seems inevitable, however, given that the
Dastar Court justified its holding by making repeated references to
79. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37-38 (2003).
80. See Posner, supra note 64, at 639.
81. 299 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2004).
82. Id. at 568-69.
83. Id. at 572.
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. See supra Part I.B.1.
2006]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
patent law and policy.8 6 The Court's final and most concise statement
of its holding, moreover, not only expressly invokes patents; it puts
them on equal footing with copyrights:
In sum, reading the phrase "origin of goods" in the Lanham
Act in accordance with the Act's common-law foundations
(which were not designed to protect originality or creativity),
and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were), we
conclude that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangi-
ble goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of
any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
goods.87
It surely remains only a matter of time before some clever defendant,
facing an accusation of the reverse passing off of subject matter within
the scope of patent law, successfully invokes that language to dismiss
the claim. That will hardly represent a breakthrough; as the Dastar
opinion's review of the precedents make plain, the Court has long
limited states from interfering with patent law and policy.88 It will,
however, represent one more example of the case's application to a
form of intellectual property not before the Dastar court.
3. Expanding Dastar to Services.-Dastar speaks only of the proper
definition of the "origin ... of... goods" in § 43 (a) (1) (A) .89 Yet that
section refers not to goods alone, but to "goods, services, or commer-
cial activities," together. ° Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, courts have
expanded Dastar beyond mere goods, to services and commercial ac-
tivities. The court in Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., flatly rejected
the plaintiff's claim that Dastar could not preempt a claim for the re-
verse passing off of services. 1 More than that, the Williams court au-
daciously countered that Dastar itself in fact concerned not goods but
services, claiming that "in Dastar, the defendant did exactly what Plain-
tiff accuses Defendants of doing here-attributing to itself and its em-
ployees various 'services' that the plaintiffs claimed they, in fact,
86. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003)
(citing patent cases as authority and using the phrase "patent or copyright" several times).
87. Id. at 37.
88. E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111 (1938).
89. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37 ("[T]lhe phrase 'origin of goods' in the Lanham Act...
refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author
of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.").
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (A) (2000).
91. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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provided on the defendant's videotapes. '9 2 Although it did not offer
a similarly bold-or, indeed, any-defense of its move, the court in
Tao of Systems Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Services & Materials, Inc., be-
cause it found that Dastar barred a § 43(a) complaint alleging the re-
verse passing off of engineering services, also arguably expanded
Dastar to cover the reverse passing off of services as well as of goods.93
4. Expanding Dastar to State Law Reverse Passing Off Claims.-Das-
tar speaks only of the relationship between copyright law and the fed-
eral law of unfair competition. The Supreme Court said nothing in
that case about how to resolve the analogous reverse passing off claim
that the plaintiffs had raised under California's state law of unfair
competition. That issue was not before the Dastar Court. As the
Court observed, the Ninth Circuit opinion under review had "said
nothing with regard to the state-law claim."94 More recently, however,
lower courts have in several instances read Dastar to preempt state law
reverse passing off claims like the one at issue in that case. As this
Subsection details, however, those courts have said very little to ex-
plain why Dastar has that effect.
The short list of lower court cases applying Dastar to preempt
state law reverse passing off claims begins with Dastar itself, on re-
mand.95 After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth
Circuit's resolution of the Lanham Act claim at issue in Dastar, the
defendants asked the district court to revisit the plaintiffs' state law
claim and dismiss it with prejudice.96 The court granted both
requests. 7
As is typical for courts applying Dastar to preempt state law re-
verse passing off claims, the court hearing Dastar on remand failed to
explain the legal basis for its decision. Instead, the court simply pro-
nounced, "The Supreme Court's finding that Defendants' actions
were not misleading under the Lanham Act controls the resolution of
their California unfair competition claim."9' Why did the Supreme
Court opinion "control"? The court did not say.
That pattern set by the court considering Dastar on remand-
enigmatically relying on the Supreme Court's opinion to reject a state
92. Id.
93. 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va. 2004).
94. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28.
95. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-07189, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21194 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003).
96. Id. at *5-*6.
97. Id. at *15.
98. Id. at *14.
2006]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
law-has since recurred each time a lower court has cited Dastaras the
reason for preempting a reverse passing off claim raised under state
law. The court in Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc.,99 offered the long-
est, but least clear, justification. When it first raised the question of
whether the plaintiffs state law unfair competition claim should suffer
preemption, the Aagard court framed the issue solely in terms of
§ 301 (a) of the Copyright Act.' 0 0 Before applying that statutory pre-
emption provision, however, the court turned to the problem of dis-
entangling the two theories embedded in the plaintiffs claim, "a
hybrid of both traditional and reverse palming off."'' Once having
solved that problem, the court returned to the question of whether
the reverse passing off claim merited preemption. 10 2
From that point onward, the Aagard court's inquiry into the pre-
emption of state reverse passing off claims made no reference to
§ 301 (a). That undoubtedly improved the opinion, since the court's
earlier summary of Ninth Circuit law had sorely misstated the scope of
§ 301 (a) preemption.1 0 3 Fortunately, if perhaps inadvertently, the
Aagard court dropped the § 301 (a) approach and instead relied solely
on Dastar to resolve the preemption of the state reverse passing off
claim.10 4 After relating Dastars holding with regard to federal unfair
competition claims, the Aagard court concluded,
Similarly, courts in this Circuit previously held that claims
asserted pursuant to California unfair competition laws are
"substantially congruent" to claims filed under the Lanham
Act. Accordingly, state law claims which rely upon reverse
99. 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
100. Id. at 1216. For a discussion of § 301(a) and its application to reverse passing off
claims, see infra Part III.
101. Aagard, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
102. Id. at 1218.
103. The Aagard court said, "Reverse palming off claims are preempted unless they al-
lege bodily appropriation and the claimant seeks more than mere monetary damages." Id.
at 1217. The court accurately described Ninth Circuit law regarding the first of those two
elements, bodily appropriation. In support of the second, however, the court wrongly
cited Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2001), as authority.
Id. In fact, Firoozye concerned not a claim for reverse passing off, but rather conversion, a
distinctly different cause of action. Firoozye, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-30, 1131 n.7. The
Firoozye court merely said, quite plausibly given the extant case law and commentary, that
"while a claim for conversion typically involves tangible property and thus may be immune
from preemption, where a plaintiff is only seeking damages from a defendant's reproduc-
tion of a work-and not the actual return of a physical piece of property-the claim is
preempted." Id. at 1130. Contrary to the Aagard court, there appears to be no support, in
Firooyze or elsewhere, for preempting a reverse passing off claim because it seeks damages.
104. Aagard, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
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palming off of communicative products also conflict with-
and are, therefore, preempted by-federal copyright law.'0 5
The court in Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc.1°6 offered almost
exactly the same holding, though without bothering with any feints
towards § 301 (a). The plaintiff before the Williams court, realizing
that the just-issued opinion in Dastar doomed its Lanham Act unfair
competition claim, asked for leave to amend its complaint so as to add
a reverse passing off claim under state law."' The Williams court suc-
cinctly denied that request on the grounds that "[t]he Ninth Circuit
has consistently held that state law unfair competition claims are 'con-
gruent' with Lanham Act claims; Plaintiff's putative unfair competi-
tion claim would fail for the same reasons his Lanham Act claim
fails." 108 In similar fashion, the court in Bob Creeden & Associates, Ltd.
v. Infosofi, Inc., cited the congruence between the Illinois unfair com-
petition under which plaintiff had pleaded reverse passing off and the
Lanham Act, concluding, "Because [plaintiff] fails to state a claim
under the Lanham Act, [plaintiff] likewise has no claim under Illinois'
statutory unfair competition laws."' 9
Quoting the four lower courts that have applied Dastar to state
reverse passing off claims, while useful in itself, proves most useful for
demonstrating what those cases did not say. Although those courts
made clear that Dastar influenced their deliberations, they did not
identify the source of that influence. And none but the district court
considering Dastar on remand identified the power of that influ-
ence.110 In saying that the Supreme Court's opinion "controls the res-
olution of [plaintiffs'] California unfair competition claim," that
district court suggested that it had no choice in the matter. 1 " Aagard,
Williams, and Creeden say still less. So far as those cases' language goes,
Dastarmight represent no more than persuasive authority. The extant
case law thus demonstrates only that Dastar has something to do with
the preemption of state reverse passing off claims. Figuring out the
basis and extent of Dastars power requires that we go beyond those
cases to more general principles of preemption.
1 1 2
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
107. Id. at 1186.
108. Id.
109. 326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
110. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-07189, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21194, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Oct, 14, 2003).
111. Id.
112. See infra Part II.
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C. Dastar in the Commentary
Although Dastar has attracted a fair amount of commentary, none
of it appears to hit upon the thesis set forth here. The most impas-
sioned discussions about Dastar tend, unsurprisingly, to arise from the
debate between the case's champions and its critics. Commentators
on the "pro" side of Dastar tout the case as a victory for the public
domain. 13 Commentators on the "con" side criticize Dastar for un-
necessarily limiting an important means of protecting consumers
from reverse passing off.114 A separate, less polarized vein of com-
mentary discusses whether Dastar's holding reflects primarily a ques-
tion of how to interpret the Lanham Act"' or instead a broad inquiry
113. See, e.g., Lynn McLain, Thoughts on Dastar from a Copyright Perspective: A Welcome Step
Toward Respitefor the Public Domain, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71, 72 (2002) ("Dastaris a
welcome step towards regaining the public domain .... ."); Ruth L. Okediji, Through the
Years: The Supreme Court and the Copyright Clause, 30 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633, 1636
(2004) ("The decision affirmed a vision of the public domain as a resource for completely
unconditional access to, and use of, expired copyrighted works."); Kurt M. Saunders, A
Crusade in the Public Domain: The Dastar Decision, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161,
172 (2004) ("The Supreme Court's holding in Dastarwas a pragmatic result that avoided a
further enclosure of the public domain and reinforced the notion that the public domain
is indispensable to future creative endeavor.") (footnote omitted); Niels Schaumann, Copy-
right, Containers, and the Court: A Reply to Professor Leaffer, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1617,
1631 (2004) ("To me, the most reassuring thing about Dastaris that the Court declined to
create new copyright-like rights in public domain works."); Joshua K. Simko, "Every Artist Is
a Cannibal, Every Poet Is a Thief': Why the Supreme Court Was Right to Reverse the Ninth Circuit in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 1IJ. INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 366 (2004)
("[Dastar] paves the way for artists and producers of creative works to incorporate prior
public domain works, thereby enhancing meaning and allowing a richness and complexity
of interpretation .... "); Richard Ronald, Note, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 243, 255 (2004) (describing Dastar as "good policy"
because it "frees manufactures [sic] to use public domain works without fear of a burden-
some attribution requirement").
114. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trade-
marks Law, 41 Hous. L. REv. 263, 268 (2004) ("Dastar... prompts the concern-reinforced
by lower court decisions interpreting Dastar-that the Supreme Court may have disquali-
fied authors from pleading the trademarks act's prohibition on false designation of origin
to support a claim to attribution of authorship status."); F. Scott Kieff, Contrived Conflicts:
The Supreme Court Versus the Basics of Intellectual Property Law, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1717,
1725 (2004) (complaining that Dastars "contrivance about the power of § 43(a) runs the
risk of eviscerating the carefully crafted balance ... set forth in the Lanham Act"); Greg
Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1204 (2005) (describ-
ing the opinion's scope as "sweeping," "startling," and ultimately, "bizarre"); Marshall Leaf-
fer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1597, 1614 (2004) (questioning the Court's rationale on grounds that he "fail[s] to see
how the requirement to acknowledge authorship would be that onerous and would im-
properly extend copyright").
115. See, e.g., Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 272, 327 (2004) ("[I]n Dastar the Court was not.. . interpreting the copy-
right statute but rather section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.").
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into harmonizing Supreme Court precedents, federal unfair competi-
tion law, and copyright policy." 6 Commentators have also pondered
whether and to what extent Dastar carries a message about constitu-
tional limits on the federal government's power to protect intellectual
property." 7 Each of those various lines of inquiry has its virtues, of
course. None, however, appears to attempt a detailed examination of
how Dastar's expansive reception by lower courts heralds a revolution
in copyright preemption doctrine."' Aiming to fill that gap in the
academic commentary on Dastar, the next Part takes up that task.
II. WHAT DASTAR AND ITS PROGENY Do
This Part considers not what courts and commentators say about
Dastar, the topic of the prior Part, but rather what that case and its
116. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademars and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 883 n.244 (2004) ("Though Dastar involved arguments about the limited con-
struction of the Lanham Act, the Court's analysis possibly also adverts to ... the constitu-
tional structure for protecting intellectual property."); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 203 (2004)
(asserting that "mere statutory interpretation tools do not provide a complete explanation"
for the case's reasoning); David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism
(Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Of]), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4244 (2004) (argu-
ing that the case's holding falls somewhere between a mere interpretation of
§ 43(a)(1)(A) and a negation of any Lanham Act claim concerning authorship); see also
Moffat, supra note 57, at 1523 (criticizing Dastar on grounds "the Court did not deal with
the variety of problems posed by concurrent trademark and copyright protection").
117. See, e.g., Leafier, supra note 114, at 1615 (arguing that, contrary to what some com-
mentators might like to think, Dastar "avoided an important and controversial issue con-
cerning legislative authority in the field of intellectual property law"); Edward Lee, The
Public 's Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government's Power to Control Public
Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HAsTINGs L.J. 91, 108 n.67 (2003) (crediting
Dastar for "avoiding discussion of possible constitutional limitations"); Nachbar, supra note
115, at 327 (arguing that Dastarsays little or nothing about limits on federal power because
"there was no challenge to Congress's power in" the case); Schaumann, supra note 113, at
1630 (asserting that "the Court nearly (but not quite) implies that the Commerce Clause
power cannot be exercised in a way that conflicts with the Copyright Clause"); Diane Leen-
heer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73
FoRD-iAM L. REV. 297, 321 (2004) (saying that Dastar limits federal power over copyrighted
expressions, but does not "answer whether there are comparable limits on Congress's
power to create novel interests that do not fall under the umbrella of copyright").
118. But for a brief but insightful analysis that touches on some similar themes, see
Michael Landau, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection ofAttribu-
tion Rights in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRvEY AM. L. 273, 304-06 (2005), which I first
discovered only some months after this paper had been accepted for publication. See also
Lastowka, supra note 114, at 1213 n.211 (saying of the Dastar Court's invocation of § 1Q6A
as proof that federal lawmakers meant to preclude any other protections of attribution
rights, "The most plausible (and, at the same time, the most radical) reading of the conflict
would ... focus on... some form of constitutional preemption .... For instance, it could
conceivably affect other non-copyright schemes protecting authorship rights, including
state laws concerning misappropriation and rights of publicity").
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progeny actually do in practice. Ordinarily, that sort of distinction
would not bear much fruit. Especially in the law (as opposed to, say,
sports), words tend to equate to results. In the particular instance of
Dastar and related cases, however, a telling gap has opened between
what courts say and what they do. The Supreme Court said in Dastar,
for instance, that it was limiting the scope of the Lanham Act. In fact,
however, thanks to the functional equality of a § 43(a) reverse passing
off claim and a typical state law reverse passing off claim, the Dastar
Court limited both federal and state law.119 Similarly, lower courts
applying Dastar say (insofar as they say anything) that it bars state law
reverse passing off claims simply because they traditionally treat those
claims in the same way they treat federal ones. 120 Whether they real-
ize it or not, however, those lower courts have launched a revolution
in copyright preemption doctrine. Section A shows that Dastar has
preempted state reverse passing off claims, whereas Section B explains
how Dastar does so. Section C, briefly touching on a different aspect
of Dastar, argues that the case has put teeth back into the Copyright
Clause's "limited times" provision.
A. Copyright Preempts State Unfair Competition Law
Courts applying Dastar have already demonstrated that the case
has the power to stop a state law reverse passing off claim dead in its
tracks. 121 Those courts have not, however, clearly identified why Das-
tar has that effect. Insofar as those courts have said anything about
the source of Dastar's influence over state law claims, they have typi-
cally spoken as if it exercised no more than persuasive authority.
The court in Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., for instance, simply
observed, "The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state law un-
fair competition claims are 'congruent' with Lanham Act claims;
Plaintiff's putative unfair competition claim would fail for the same
reasons his Lanham Act claim fails."' 22 The court in Bob Creeden &
Associates, Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc.,' 23 cited a similar congruence between
the Illinois unfair competition law under which plaintiff had pleaded
reverse passing off and the Lanham Act. The Creeden court con-
cluded, "Because [plaintiff] fails to state a claim under the Lanham
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. See supra Part I.B.4.
121. See supra Part I.B.4.
122. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
123. 326 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Il. 2004).
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Act, [plaintiff] likewise has no claim under Illinois' statutory unfair
competition laws." '24
Statements so brief do not suffice to bridge the gap between fed-
eral and state law. How could the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Lanham Act in Dastar possibly reach all the way down to control
the disposition of a similar state law claim? The Dastar Court offered
many justifications for its holding. Perhaps the Williams and Creeden
courts simply found those reasons convincing. In that event, Dastar
would serve as nothing more than persuasive authority about how to
interpret a state unfair competition law in light of enlightened public
policy.
Surely, though, Dastar exercises more than merely persuasive au-
thority over state law reverse passing off claims. Suppose, for instance,
that a lower court were to disagree with the Williams and Creeden
courts about Dastar's wisdom. Would that court enjoy complete free-
dom to let stand a state law reverse passing off claim arising under
facts functionally equivalent? Surely not. The district court tasked
with considering Dastar on remand from the Supreme Court evidently
felt at no such liberty. That district court said that "the Supreme
Court's finding that Defendants' actions were not misleading under
the Lanham Act controls the resolution of their California unfair com-
petition claim."125 That strongly suggests that Dastar had more than
merely persuasive authority.
Although still on the skimpy side, the explanation offered by the
Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc.126 court for applying Dastar to a state
law reverse passing off claim reveals why the lower court had to hew to
the higher one. Like the Williams and Creeden courts, the Aagard court
first noted that "California unfair competition laws are 'substantially
congruent' to claims filed under the Lanham Act." '127 Unlike its judi-
cial counterparts, however, the Aagard court added the crucial link
between the state and federal claims: "Accordingly, state law claims
which rely upon reverse palming off of communicative products also
conflict with-and are, therefore, preempted by-federal copyright
law." 128
That hardly says it all, but it does say a lot. The Aagard court
quite rightly notes that courts facing state law reverse passing off
124. Id. at 880.
125. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-07189, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21194, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003) (emphasis added).
126. 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
127. Id. at 1218.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
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claims akin to the Lanham Act claim at issue in Dastar do not have any
choice in the matter; those courts must strike the state law claims as
preempted by federal law. The Aagard court does not, however, spec-
ify exactly why such state law claims suffer preemption. Does some
specific provision of the "federal copyright law" to which Aagard refers
have that effect? Or does the Copyright Act as a whole stand in the
way of Dastar-like state reverse passing off claims? To those questions,
the next Section turns.
B. Direct Supremacy Clause Preemption, Rediscovered
The U.S. Constitution provides that it and the laws made under it
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." '29 The
Constitution also expressly empowers federal lawmakers to pass legis-
lation creating and protecting copyright rights. 3 The Constitution's
Supremacy Clause thus provides the ultimate justification for copy-
right's preemption of state laws, no matter what guise that preemp-
tion takes. Dastar does not change that. The case does, however,
herald a shift in the type of copyright preemption that courts favor,
away from the express preemption of § 301(a) and toward the more
general principles of implied preemption applied in Dastar. Because
different sorts of preemption have different effects, moreover, that
doctrinal shift promises to broaden the scope of copyright
preemption.
Courts have enforced the Supremacy Clause by way of three dif-
ferent types of preemption: field preemption, express preemption,
and implied preemption.1 3 ' Field preemption arises when "Congress
has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field
of regulation and has thereby 'left no room for the States to supple-
ment' federal law.' 32 Because the Copyright Act leaves many open-
129. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
130. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
131. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984); World Auxiliary
Power Co. v. Silicon Valley Bank, 303 F.3d 1120, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2002); Mark A. Lemley,
Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. Rxv. 111,
137-38 (1999) (using the terms "field preemption," "express conflicts preemption," and
"implied conflicts preemption"); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of
Publicity, 36 U.C. DAiS L. REv. 199, 236-37 (2002) (using "explicit" rather than "express"
preemption).
132. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 699 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d at 1128 (stating that field
preemption "leav[es] no room for the operation of state law") (quoting Keams v. Tempe
Tech. Inst., Inc., 39 F.3d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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ings for state law to play a role, 133 field preemption plays a distinctly
minor role in copyright.13 1 It thus far appears to have occurred only
in cases finding that the Copyright Act's recordation provisions so oc-
cupy the field as to preempt state recordation laws from having an
effect.'
35
Section 301 (a), because it explicitly delineates the proper limits
of state law, operates by dint of express preemption. 36 Between its
enactment in the 1976 Copyright Act and the advent of Dastar,
§ 301 (a) held a near monopoly in copyright preemption analysis.'1 7
Having that statutory provision ready-at-hand, and lacking any equally
authoritative alternative, courts quite naturally relied on § 301 (a) in
determining the scope of copyright preemption. 13  Through Dastar,
however, the Supreme Court has, intentionally or otherwise, breathed
new life into implied copyright preemption.
At one time, prior to § 301 (a)'s introduction of express preemp-
tion, copyright law preempted state laws impliedly or not at all.1 39 Rel-
atively few cases found preemption under that doctrine, however,14 °
133. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [B] [3] [a],
at 1-63 n.257.1 (2005) ("Given that the states may legitimately regulate many aspects relat-
ing to copyrightable compositions, that aspect of the pre-emption doctrine would appear
not generally applicable here.").
134. Rothman claimed it plays no role. See Rothman, supra note 131, at 237. Recent
cases evince a contrary view, however. See, e.g., World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d at 1128-
29 (addressing the question of whether the Copyright Act's recordation provisions pre-
empt state law recordation laws as one of "field" preemption).
135. See, e.g., Peregrine Entm't Ltd. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver, 116
B.R. 194, 201-02 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) ("[A]ny state recordation system pertaining to
interests in copyrights would be preempted by the Copyright Act."). But see World Auxiliary
Power Co., 303 F.3d at 1129-30 (limiting Peregyine's holding to registered copyrights).
136. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, § 1.01[B], at 1-8 ("Congress has acted in
explicit terms to pre-empt various state laws through Section 301 of the Copyright Act of
1976."); Rothman, supra note 131, at 237 (claiming that express preemption "clearly exists
in copyright law because of the Section 301 preemption clause contained within the Copy-
right Act"). But see Lemley, supra note 131, at 139 (applying the "field" label to § 301 (a)
preemption).
137. For a description of § 301 (a)'s operation, as well as a small sample of the many,
many cases employing that provision in questions of preemption, see infra Part III.
138. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, § 1.01 [B], at 1-8 (stating that because of
§ 301 (a), "courts usually need not gauge whether the federal interest in this field is domi-
nant, whether the field of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to raise an infer-
ence of intent to pre-empt, or whether any of the other pre-emption tests apply; rather, in
general the courts may simply turn to the explicit statutory language") (footnotes
omitted).
139. See id. (describing copyright preemption prior to the 1976 act).
140. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980)
(affirming summary judgment against a common-law unfair competition claim based on
defendants' use of facts on grounds that, under Sears and Compco, "states are pre-empted
from removing such material from the public domain"); Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Sports
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nor have many cases done so since. Section 301 (a) did not take over
copyright preemption doctrine immediately, of course. In the span
before that legislative innovation had seen much judicial interpreta-
tion, courts sometimes bolstered their preemption analyses by draw-
ing on old case law that had of necessity relied on the Supremacy
Clause alone.' 41 But that shows little more than an understandable
preference for familiar precedents-not that implied copyright pre-
emption enjoyed a robust coexistence with express preemption under
§ 301(a).
After § 301 (a) rose to dominate copyright preemption doctrine,
courts relied on implied preemption only in those particular and
somewhat rare cases where a state regulatory scheme targeting rights
and remedies under the Copyright Act was at stake. 14 2 Or, more accu-
rately, courts arguably relied on implied preemption in those cases.
The case of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.143 offers a characteristi-
cally ambiguous example of the genre. The court there held a Louisi-
ana statute regulating software licenses preempted without evidently
relying on § 301 (a).' 4 4 Neither, however, did the court disparage that
section's relevance. And, notably, the lower court in Vault had re-
solved the preemption issue by citing both § 301 and the implied pre-
emption doctrine expressed in the Supreme Court's Sears and Compco
cases.' 45 Given its relatively quick discussion of the preemption issue,
the court of appeals might well have simply neglected to cite the for-
mer source of preemption law. Ass'n of American Medical Colleges v.
Cuomo.4 6 offers similarly equivocal support for the supposition that
implied copyright preemption flourished alongside § 301(a). The
Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (denying preliminary injunction on
grounds that plaintiffs misappropriation claim was preempted under the Sears-Compco doc-
trine that "state regulation of unfair competition is pre-empted as to matters falling within
the broad confines of the copyright clause of the United States Constitution").
141. See, e.g., Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D.D.C. 1980) (applying
§ 301 to resolve the preemption issue, but also favorably quoting the Hoehling court's invo-
cation of Sears and Compco); Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publ'g Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 25-26
(N.D. Ohio 1979) (using both § 301 and the Sears-Compco doctrine to hold that plaintiff's
misappropriation claim was preempted).
142. As Paul Goldstein explains, "State regulatory programs do not fit comfortably
within the design of section 301. To varying degrees, these programs do affect copyright
subject matter. But none creates a right equivalent to copyright." 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPMGHT § 15.2.1.3, 15:16-2 (2d ed. Supp. 2005).
143. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 268-70.
145. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987) ("In
this situation the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine, as well as § 301 of the Copyright Act,
are both applicable.").
146. 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991).
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court there, evaluating a New York law requiring disclosure of statisti-
cal information about and contents of academic exams, concluded
that if the state law "facilitates infringement, it conflicts with the fed-
eral Copyright Act and is preempted."'4 7 That arguably represents an
instance of implied preemption, as the court did not cite § 301(a).
But, then again, the court did not outwardly reject that section nor
criticize an earlier trial court's invocation of § 301 (a) to evaluate the
preemption of that same state law.14
Perhaps the case of American Society of Composers, Authors, & Pub-
lishers v. Pataki'49 offers a clear example of implied copyright preemp-
tion during the reign of § 301(a). That case concerned a New York
state law requiring performing arts societies to give notice before in-
vestigating a party suspected of violating the copyrights of the socie-
ties' members and imposing sanctions on the societies if they failed to
give the suspect the required notice.' 5 ° The Pataki court found that
statute preempted without making any reference to § 301 (a). It in-
stead relied on Cuomo and an old implied preemption precedent1 51 to
conclude, "Because the provisions impose a notice requirement on
copyright enforcers, and make non-compliance with the requirement
actionable, the provisions hinder the realization of the federal copy-
right scheme." 152
Even supposing that those cases show implied preemption sur-
vived in one small corner of copyright law, they hardly show the doc-
trine thriving after the enactment of § 301(a). At a minimum, it
seems fair to say that for many years § 301 (a) almost wholly crushed
any interest in resolving copyright preemption questions by way of di-
rect appeal to the Supremacy Clause. Furthermore, courts consider-
ing the sorts of generic common-law or statutory claims typically
responsible for triggering preemption inquiries-claims of unfair
competition, misappropriation, conversion, breach of contract, or so
forth-have long shown absolutely no interest in stepping outside the
bounds of § 301 (a). So copyright preemption appeared, at any rate,
prior to Dastar.
147. Id. at 523. The court remanded the case for further consideration of that issue. Id.
at 526.
148. See Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding sufficient merit in the claim that § 301 (a) preempted the state law to justify issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction against its enforcement).
149. 930 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
150. Id. at 876.
151. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
152. Pataki, 930 F. Supp. at 878.
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Seen against that background, Dastar's impact on copyright pre-
emption jumps forth. After nearly thirty years under the hegemony of
§ 301 (a), and thanks solely to Dastar's liberating effect, courts have
begun to revisit the fundamentals of copyright preemption. Inten-
tionally or not, Dastar has freed lower courts to go beyond the stric-
tures of § 301 (a) and to make a direct appeal to the Supremacy
Clause in questioning whether a state law cause of action conflicts with
the Copyright Act.' 5 3 As discussed below, 1 54 that stands to reshape the
future of copyright preemption.
C. Teeth Given to "Limited Times"
Dastar teaches us that the Copyright Clause's "limited times" pro-
vision has real bite in preempting some state law claims. Which ones?
Those that risk giving indefinite protection to works within the scope
of federal copyright law. Dastar's rule applies regardless of whether
preempted state law claims require more elements than a copyright
law claim would and, according to lower courts' broad interpretations
of Dastar, regardless of whether or not those state protections have in
fact begun to outlive copyright ones. It suffices, in light of Dastar, that
a state law risks limiting public use of fixed works of authorship for a
period exceeding the limits imposed by federal copyright law.
The preemptive powers released in Dastar arise directly from the
Supremacy Clause, independent of § 301 of the Copyright Act. That
marks something of an innovation in copyright jurisprudence, which
since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act has relied almost en-
tirely on § 301's codification of copyright preemption. But it should
come as no surprise to anyone familiar with patent preemption. In a
long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution's
Patent Clause and Supremacy Clause can preempt conflicting state
laws directly, without the help of any federal legislation. 155 Patent pre-
emption could happen no other way, given that the Patent Act' 56 has
no counterpart to the Copyright Act's § 301. Recognizing that the
Constitution's Copyright and Supremacy Clauses combine to preempt
conflicting state laws directly, without the intermediation of the Copy-
153. See supra Part I.B (describing how courts have used Dastar rather than § 301 (a) to
decide copyright preemption questions).
154. See infra Part IV.
155. E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111 (1938).
156. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (2000).
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right Act, thus simply brings copyright law up to speed with patent
law.
Bonito Boats does not mandate a contrary holding. Granted, the
Court in that case airily claimed "that the Patent and Copyright
Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication, deprive
the States of the power to adopt rules for the promotion of intellec-
tual creation within their own jurisdictions."' 57 But both the holding
and reasoning of that case indicate that the Court recognized the
power of constitutional provisions alone, operating without the back-
ing of any statutory preemption clause, to preempt conflicting state
laws. The Bonito Boats Court did, after all, preempt the state boat-hull
protections under review, notwithstanding the absence of any Patent
Act counterpart to the preemption clause set forth in § 301 of the
Copyright Act.' 58
Dastar thereby stands in contrast with the slightly earlier Supreme
Court case of Eldred v. Ashcroft."'59 Faced with a plea to strike down the
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) as an unconstitutional exten-
sion of the term of copyright, the Eldred Court demurred. 60 Finding
that the CTEA satisfied a rational basis inquiry, the Court held that "it
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue
the Copyright Clause's objectives." '61 But that does not quite put Das-
tar and Eldred into contradiction. The Eldred Court premised its hold-
ing on the fact that (as the Court regarded it) the CTEA did not
create perpetual copyrights.162 The Dastar Court, in contrast, found
the reverse passing off claims under its review guilty of exactly that
offense. "To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a) cre-
ated a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may
not do," the Dastar Court concluded, citing Eldred in its defense.' 63
III. CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTION THAT § 301 (A)
PREEMPTS REVERSE PASSING OFF CLAIMS
Some authorities assert that § 301(a) of the Copyright Act
preempts state law reverse passing off claims against defendants who
market communicative products.'64 Were that claim true, it would
157. Bonito Boats Inc., 489 U.S. at 165.
158. Id. at 167-68.
159. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
160. Id. at 214.
161. Id. at 212.
162. Id. at 209.
163. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
164. E.g., Higher Gear Group, Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d
953, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("[C]laims based on 'reverse passing off,' where a defendant sells
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mitigate this Article's argument that Dastar has revived direct
Supremacy Clause preemption of state laws that conflict with federal
copyright power."' To the contrary, § 301 (a) would suffice to pre-
empt the sorts of claims at issue in Dastar. In that event, courts
could-and undoubtedly would-continue to rely solely on the Copy-
right Act to resolve copyright preemption issues. Direct Supremacy
Clause preemption would remain a largely theoretical issue in copy-
right law, one unlikely to have any practical impact. As this section
explains, however, no authority can convincingly assert that § 301 (a)
preempts state law claims like those at issue in Dastar nor, when read
closely, do many authorities actually assert as much.
Section 301 (a) of the Copyright Act preempts any state law that
satisfies two conditions: it creates "legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106," and those rights cover "works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103 .... "166 The second condition does not have particular
pertinence to the question of § 301 (a)'s power to preempt state re-
verse passing off claims; the issue turns on interpretation of the first
condition. 167
As the plain language of that provision suggests, and as courts
and commentators agree, if a state law claim requires proof of an ele-
ment not required for a copyright claim, that state law claim will es-
cape preemption under § 301 (a).16 A state law unfair competition
reverse passing off claim easily passes that test. Generally speaking,
a plaintiffs product as his own, are generally preempted."); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1181 (N.D. 111. 1997) ("Claims premised on
reverse passing off are preempted under the [Copyright] Act."); 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
142, § 15.16.1.3.a, 15:143 ("Courts have held that section 301 preempts actions for 'reverse
passing off' in which the defendant copies the plaintiffs work and passes it off as defen-
dant's.") (footnote omitted).
165. See supra Part II.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
167. Id. § 301(b).
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to-(l) subject matter that does not come
within the subject matter of copyright . . . [or] (3) activities violating legal or
equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 ....
Id.
168. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992); Oddo v.
Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1984); 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 142, at 15.2.1.2, 15:10-11;
see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, § 1.01 [B] [1], at 1-14 (collecting cases in support
of the proposition that "the 'extra element' test generally furnishes the touchstone here").
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such a claim requires proof that the defendant: (1) caused likely com-
mercial harm to the plaintiff (2) by misrepresenting, (3) in a manner
likely to confuse prospective consumers, (4) that the defendant was
the origin of goods or services (5) in fact originating with the plain-
tiff. 16 9 All but the last of those elements go beyond the requirements
for a copyright infringement claim.
Consider, for instance, someone who illegally duplicates copy-
righted movies and sells them as admittedly unauthorized copies. Far
from misrepresenting the source of those movies, the pirate trumpets
the fact that he offers good but cheap copies of someone else's intel-
lectual property.1 70 He thus commits copyright infringement without
also engaging in the reverse passing off of a communicative prod-
uct. 171 Such a reverse passing off would require proof of different and
additional elements-namely, misrepresentations likely to confuse
consumers as to the origin of the movie-not required by the copy-
right infringement claim. Commentators thus agree that § 301 (a)
should not preempt a well-pleaded claim under state law against the
reverse passing off of a communicative product. 172
Most courts agree. In particular, and notably, 173 the Second and
Ninth Circuits have concluded that a well-pleaded reverse passing off
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995).
170. Recall that we here question whether the pirate is engaging in the reverse passing
off of the copyrighted movie, rather than of the physical DVDs or video tapes on which the
copyright recorded the movie. The latter, entirely different practice, would surely support
an unfair competition claim. See Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23,
31 (2003) (explaining that the plaintiffs' claim "would undoubtedly be sustained if Dastar
had bought some of New Line's Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them as its
own").
171. Strictly speaking, even if the pirate misrepresented that he was selling legal copies
of the movie, he would risk liability for the direct passing off of the DVDs or videos as
authentic, rather than for the reverse passing off someone else's goods or services as his
own. I describe the pirate as selling admittedly unauthorized copies only because pirates
sometimes do so and because it simplifies the example.
172. See 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 142, at § 15.2.1.2, 15:15 ("Courts have held that
§ 301 (a) encompasses state unfair competition claims that allege misappropriation, but
not the extra element of consumer confusion as to source .... ") (footnote omitted);
NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 133, § 1.01 [B] [1], at 1-13 n.62 ("[F]alse representation as to
the identity of the author or copyright owner is not an act of copyright infringement, and
hence, a state law prohibiting such conduct is not an 'equivalent' right."); John T. Cross,
Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in Trademark
Law, 72 WASH. L. REv. 709, 747-48 (1997) (explaining that reverse passing off should not
be preempted under § 301 (a) because "[s] tate law reverse passing off almost always in-
cludes an important extra element that makes it qualitatively different than any of the
rights granted by section 106 of the Copyright Act. This extra element is defendant's false
representation that defendant is the source of the product") (footnote omitted).
173. Given the volume and significance of the copyright cases that the two circuits gen-
erate, "[s]ome view the Second and the Ninth Circuits as the defacto consolidated court of
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claim includes extra elements protecting it from § 301(a) preemp-
tion. Courts elsewhere largely concur.
Start with the Second Circuit. Although the circuit court in
Kregos v. Associated Press found the state law unfair competition-qua-
false designation of origin claim under consideration preempted by
§ 301 (a), it did so because, "as [plaintiff] has formulated his plead-
ings, the claim contains no element to qualitatively differentiate it
from those areas protected by copyright."1" 4 The plaintiff complained
only that the defendants had published his work without crediting
him-not that they had taken credit for it themselves. 175 He thus
failed to properly plead the extra elements that distinguish a reverse
passing off claim from a copyright one. 176 Conversely, the circuit
court in Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, Inc. ventured that "[a]
claim of reverse passing off is separate and distinct from a claim of
copyright infringement."
17 7
District courts in the Second Circuit have in recent years both
followed Kregos and confirmed the implication that a well-pleaded re-
verse passing off claim will not suffer preemption under § 301 (a).
The court in Faulkner v. National Geographic Society, for instance, held
that "[p] laintiffs' common law unfair competition claim is preempted
because it alleges nothing other than false designation of origin
through improper use of copyright notice."1 78 The court in Silverstein
v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., in contrast, found that the plaintiff's "unfair
competition claims covering reverse passing off are not preempted be-
cause those claims involve the extra element of misrepresentation or
deception."' 79 After confirming that "unfair competition claims as-
serting 'reverse passing off' claims are generally not preempted by the
copyright laws," the court in Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc.
found the particular claims before it failed on other grounds.180 The
copyright appeals... ." Chris J. Katopis, The Federal Circuit's Forgotten Lessons?: Annealing
New Forms of Intellectual Property Through Consolidated Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 581, 612-13 (1999).
174. 3 F.3d 656, 666 (2d Cir. 1993).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994). Notably, however, that statement qualifies as dicta
with regard to state law reverse passing off claims. Although the circuit court was vacating
in part Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the portion
of that trial opinion disposing of the state law reverse passing off claim was not on appeal.
178. 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Faulk-
ner v. Nat'l Geographic Enters., 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005).
179. No. 01 Civ. 309, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5487, *25-*26 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 2003), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 368 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2004).
180. 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing the claims because "plaintiff
cannot establish substantial similarity as a matter of law").
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court in Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer likewise judged that the plaintiff
before it had "alleged the necessary extra element to affirmatively dis-
tinguish that claim from a copyright infringement action."181 Older
cases from district courts in the Second Circuit speak somewhat more
equivocally' 82 but, by dint of their age if nothing else, less
authoritatively. 183
Consistent with the plain meaning and universal interpretation of
§ 301 (a), courts in the Ninth Circuit do not read that provision to
preempt a state law reverse passing off claim that pleads elements be-
yond those required for a copyright claim. As the appellate court in
Summit Machine Tool Manufacturing Corp. v. Victor CNC Systems, Inc. put
it, "State unfair competition laws which seek to prevent reverse palm-
ing off are not preempted by federal law." '84 Granted, the appellate
court of Kodadek v. MTVNetworks, Inc. subsequently found preempted
by § 301 (a) a state unfair competition claim arising out of allegations
that defendants had attributed to Mike Judge the Beavis and Butthead
characters created by plaintiff.'85 Perhaps that misattribution would
have supported a properly pleaded reverse passing off claim. The
court premised preemption analysis, however, on the observation that
the plaintiff "expressly bases his unfair competition claim on rights
granted by the Copyright Act." '86 That unfair competition claim, be-
181. 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
182. Compare Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[B]oth
passing off and reverse passing off claims involve the same additional element, misrepre-
sentation or deception, that makes it 'not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights' of copy-
right law recognized in the statute."), and Kisch v. Ammirati & Punis Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding of state passing off claim that "plaintiff is not asserting rights
equivalent to those protected by copyright and therefore does not encounter preemp-
tion"), with Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (finding preempted by § 301 (a) a claim that plaintiff characterized as "palming
off"-which the court would have allowed to escape preemption-but that the court con-
strued as a claim for reverse passing off).
183. The trial court opinion in Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), looks especially suspect. The court there held that "[w]here a plaintiff
claims that defendant has copied plaintiffs' product and sold it under defendant's name,
that claim of reverse passing off is preempted by the Copyright Act." Id. at 505. On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit vacated the case on other grounds but observed, "A claim of
reverse passing off is separate and distinct from a claim of copyright infringement." Wald-
man Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Am. Movie
Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following the
Waldman trial court opinion to find preempted by § 301 (a) a claim where defendant "is
essentially accused of exhibiting films which [plaintiff] had exclusive rights to exhibit").
184. 7 F.3d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. 152 F.3d 1209, 1210 (9th Cir. 1998).
186. Id. at 1213.
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cause it failed to add any elements beyond those in his copyright
claim, necessarily failed to escape § 301 (a) preemption.'
Following the lead of those appellate decisions, district courts in
the Ninth Circuit have found that § 301 (a) preempts only those state
law reverse passing off claims that fail to plead elements beyond those
required for a copyright claim."88 The recent case of Salim v. Lee re-
viewed Ninth Circuit law to conclude that an "unfair competition
claim is not preempted to the extent it alleges reverse passing off
under state law."1 9 Similarly, the court in Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc.
found the plaintiffs' fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims
were preempted under § 301 (a) due to their "failure to make out a
claim of 'reverse passing off."' 190 Idema thus strongly suggests what
Salim proved: a properly pleaded reverse passing off claim will survive
§ 301 (a) preemption in the Ninth Circuit. Demonstrating an oppo-
site outcome under the Ninth Circuit's test for § 301 (a) preemption,
the court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc. dismissed state law
unfair competition claims that alleged no more than "misappropria-
tion of third-party content" and "willful infringement" of
copyrights.' 9 '
Not all the decisions of district courts in the Ninth Circuit so
clearly conform to the now-prevailing view that § 301 (a) will not pre-
empt a properly pleaded reverse passing off claim. The case of CD
Law, Inc. v. LawWorks, Inc.,' 9 2 for instance, takes a little explaining.
The court there found preempted by § 301 (a) a Washington state law
unfair competition claim premised on, inter alia, the wrongful use of
information that plaintiff published on CD-ROM discs and "defend-
ants' wrongful labelling [sic] of their disc without attributing plain-
tiffs contribution." 193 As other cases demonstrate, however, no mere
187. See also Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) ("In so far as
these state claims are restatements of the copyright infringement claims, they are pre-
empted by federal copyright law.").
188. For reasons discussed supra, at Part I.B.4, the cases of Aagard v. Palomar Builders,
Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2004) and Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003), though concerning preemption of state reverse passing off
claims, do not properly qualify as cases that resolve the issue using § 301 (a). Rather, those
two cases resolve the issue using the Dastar case.
189. 202 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
190. 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The court explained that the pre-
empted claims were "virtually identical" to the Lanham Act claim the court had earlier
dismissed on those same grounds. Id.
191. 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The court cited to Kodadek in support
of its holding. Id.
192. No. C93-1011D, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 1994).
193. Id. at *7. Plaintiffs claim also alleged that defendants obtained the disc under
fraudulent pretenses. Id.
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failure to attribute will suffice to support a claim for the reverse pass-
ing off.'" 4 Also, the plaintiff in CD Law failed to allege that consumer
confusion was likely to result.1"5 The case thus did not concern a
properly pleaded claim for reverse passing off, making the CD Law
court's finding of § 301 (a) preemption consistent with the Ninth Cir-
cuit approach. Other, older decisions of district courts in the Ninth
Circuit prove more resistant to assimilation with that now-predominat-
ing view.' 96 Because those cases date back to 1990 or earlier, however,
they simply fail to reflect the Ninth Circuit's current approach to
§ 301 (a) preemption of Dastar-like claims raised under state law.
Courts elsewhere generally take the same approach to § 301 (a)
preemption of state law reverse passing off claims. District courts in
the Sixth Circuit have twice now made clear that they will permit such
a claim if it comes supported by adequate pleading.'97 District courts
in the other circuits have implied as much by preempting reverse pass-
ing off claims under § 301 (a) expressly because those claims failed to
allege the full panoply of elements that properly distinguish reverse
passing off from copyright infringement. The court in CoStar Group
Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., for instance, dismissed a reverse passing off claim
because the plaintiff alleged no more than "the mere act of copy-
ing,"'198 thus leaving open the possibility that a claim alleging misrep-
resentation of authorship and likelihood of consumer confusion
would survive § 301 (a) preemption. District courts in the Federal Cir-
194. See, e.g., CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 714 (D. Md.
2001), affd on other grounds, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning
Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 74 (D.D.C. 2000); Lacour v. Time
Warner Inc., No. 99 C 7105, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7286, *26-*27 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2000);
Meyer v. Giles, No. 4:92-CV-115, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30,
1992).
195. See CD Law, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776, at *3 (listing the plaintiff's claims).
196. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1550-51 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (finding reverse passing off claim preempted by § 301(a)); Bull Publ'g Co. v.
Sandoz Nutrition Corp., No. C87-4732-DLJ, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16622, at *18-*20 (N.D.
Cal. July 7, 1989) (same).
197. See Meyer, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264, at *9 (dismissing as preempted by § 301(a)
an unfair competition claim sounding in misappropriation, explaining, "There are no alle-
gations in the complaint regarding whether [defendant] 'palmed off or 'passed off
[plaintiff's] work as his own. Indeed, had there been such allegations in the complaint, no
preemption would be found"); P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383, 1386 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (distinguishing a misappropriation claim preempted by § 301 (a) from a claim
where "plaintiff alleges unfair competition by virtue of misrepresentation and passing off,
[which] is not subject to preemption").
198. 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 714 (D. Md. 2001), affd on other grounds, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir.
2004).
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cuit have likewise held that "'a failure to attribute' is alone insufficient
for a state-law claim to avoid Copyright Act preemption. "199
A few courts, granted, appear to have read § 301(a) to preempt
all state law reverse passing off claims, no matter how well pleaded. As
noted above, such a reading does not conform with the plain lan-
guage or received meaning of § 301 (a).200 Nor, as the above review of
the case law indicates, does that reading conform with the most au-
thoritative, numerous, and recent judicial interpretations. 20 1 None-
theless, some (but far from all) trial courts in the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits appear to have vested § 301 (a) with unduly broad
power to preempt state reverse passing off claims.
Among trial courts in the Seventh Circuit, the trend started with
FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, InC.2 0 2 Although the FASA court noted
that some courts and commentators had concluded that § 301 (a)
does not preempt state law reverse passing off claims, 20 it ultimately
concluded that the reverse passing off claim under consideration
lacked the additional elements necessary to distinguish the claim from
one for copyright infringement.2°4 For reasons carefully explained by
Roberta Kwall, FASA suffers a somewhat dubious provenance.205 Even
so, the facts of the case do not take its holding far beyond the many
cases from other jurisdictions, reviewed above,20 6 that have disallowed
inadequately pleaded state reverse passing off claims while still leaving
199. Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d
70, 74 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Peckarsky v. ABC, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 688, 696 (D.D.C. 1984)
(explaining that an assertion of a failure to attribute authorship "in an otherwise pre-
empted common law action will not save the common law claim from pre-emption").
200. See supra notes 159-166 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 167-192 and accompanying text.
202. 869 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 108 F.3d
140 (7th Cir. 1997).
203. Id. at 1362 ("Courts and commentators have not consistently answered the question
of whether a state law claim premised on reverse passing off is preempted by the Copyright
Act.").
204. Id. at 1361-64.
205. Roberta Kwall questioned the reasoning of the FASA court and observed that
had the FASA court had available to it the Second Circuit's opinion in [Waldman
Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994)], it is possible the FASA
court would have analogized the state unfair competition claim to a section 43 (a)
claim and held that the misrepresentation of a work's creator is an element that
renders the state unfair competition action "qualitatively different" from one
based on copyright law.
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire
Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REv. 985, 1019 (2002).
206. See supra notes 167-192 and accompanying text.
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room for claims that rely on the extra elements that distinguish re-
verse passing off from copyright infringement.
2 7
Most other district courts in the Seventh Circuit have taken FASA
to support an appropriately modest view of § 301 (a) .208 A couple of
district courts in the Seventh Circuit have, however, taken FASA as a
launching point for dubiously broad assertions like, "Claims premised
on reverse passing off are preempted under the [Copyright] Act. 2 0 9
Those courts did not issue holdings nearly so broad as their assertions,
however; rather, they relied on the conventional analysis under which
only inadequately pleaded reverse passing off claims suffer § 301 (a)
preemption. 0 Some courts can apparently see through that rhetoric
207. See, e.g., FASA, 869 F. Supp. at 1361 ("FASA's unfair competition counts are predi-
cated on exactly the same conduct as that underlying the copyright counts .... ."), 1361-62
("[W]e cannot conclude that an allegation of misrepresentation based solely on an alleged
infringer's act of displaying, selling, or promoting the infringing work as his or her own
creation, is sufficient to remove a state based claim from the preemptive reach of 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (a).").
208. See Mist-On Sys., Inc. v. Gilley's European Tan Spa, 303 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (finding the unfair competition claim preempted by § 301 (a) because "plaintiff
does not allege any additional facts beyond those asserted to support its copyright claim
and it does not distinguish the copyright and state common law claims"); Villa v. Brady
Publ'g, No. 02 C 570, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11753, *9 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (preempting a claim
that unauthorized reproduction of plaintiff's artwork constituted a deceptive business prac-
tice on grounds that plaintiff's assertions "are qualitatively identical to those that would be
form [sic] the basis of a copyright infringement claim"); Lacour v. Time Warner Inc., No.
99 C 7105, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7286, at *26 (N.D. I11. 2000) (holding the state law re-
verse passing off claim preempted under § 301 (a) because plaintiff alleged only that defen-
dant failed to credit him as the work's author and "does not allege any act of
misrepresentation beyond this"); Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (summarizing decisions of sister courts as holding "that the
inherent misrepresentation that accompanies the unauthorized copying and reproduction
of another's copyrighted work in a reverse passing off case without more is not enough to
constitute a cause of action under [Illinois unfair competition law]").
209. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1181
(N.D. I11. 1997); see also Higher Gear Group, Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 223
F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 (N.D. I11. 2002) (citing FASA in support of the assertion that "claims
based on 'reverse passing off,' where a defendant sells a plaintiffs product as his own, are
generally preempted").
210. See Higher Gear Group, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (explaining that § 301 (a) preempted
the state law claim before it because "[t]he crux of the claim is that [defendants] made
unauthorized copies of [plaintiffs] software, which is the same conduct necessary to sup-
port a copyright infringement claim"); Marobie-EL, 983 F. Supp. at 1180 ("Plaintiff's copy-
right infringement claim and unfair competition claim are based on the same conduct:
the unauthorized copying and distribution of its clip art .... There are no new allegations
of likelihood of consumer confusion in Count II. In fact, there are no new allegations at
all in Count II."). The Marobie-FL court added, citing FASA as support, "In any event, the
inherent misrepresentation that accompanies the unauthorized copying and distribution
of another's copyrighted work is not enough." Id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to the underlying law.211 Unfortunately, however, the court in Bal-
samo/Olson Group, Inc. v. Bradley Place Ltd. Partnership appears to have
taken that somewhat wild language seriously.
21 2
Trial courts in the Eleventh Circuit have issued contradictory
views about the power of § 301 (a) to preempt state reverse passing off
claims. The defendants in Pelican Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Shee-
ey2 '3 copied plaintiffs building plans without authorization and
under another name. The district court found that § 301 (a) did not
preempt the plaintiffs common-law unfair competition claim because
the plaintiff alleged consumer confusion. 2 14 The district court in Law
Bulletin Publishing Co. v. LRP Publications, Inc., by contrast, found the
plaintiffs reverse passing off claim preempted by § 301 (a) because
the "extra element" of "misrepresentation leading to consumer confu-
sion" that allegedly distinguished passing off claims from copyright
claims "is present only minimally in the reverse passing off con-
text. '  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the latter
case, albeit without expressly condoning the trial court's broad con-
demnation of reverse passing off claims.
2 16
Before closing this review of case law addressing whether
§ 301 (a) preempts reverse passing off claims, we should keep in mind
that, prior to Dastar, courts and litigants might not have thought or
dared to look outside of the scope of the Copyright Act when faced
with dubious state law claims. Some courts might thus have worked a
bit too hard to squeeze state law reverse passing off claims within the
bounds of § 301 (a) preemption. Courts need no longer resort to that
legal gambit, however, because Dastar has now opened the way to di-
rect Supremacy Clause preemption of reverse passing off claims that
conflict with the ends and means of copyright law. To the plain lan-
guage of § 301(a), the commentary explaining its meaning, and the
overwhelming judicial authority holding that § 301 (a) does not pre-
empt an adequately pleaded state law reverse passing off claim, courts
211. See, e.g., Chicago Style Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Sun Times, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 1204,
1208 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting the above passage from Marobie-FL, but preempting
plaintiffs claim because "plaintiff's failure to allege that the [defendant] made affirmative
misrepresentations about the origin of its 'Chicago Style' series renders its Consumer
Fraud Act claim identical to a copyright claim").
212. See 950 F. Supp. 896, 898-99 (C.D. IIl. 1997) (finding the claim under Illinois stat-
ute against deceptive trade practices preempted notwithstanding allegations of deception
causing consumer confusion).
213. No. 2:99-cv-298-FtM-21D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12577 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2000).
214. Id. at *8.
215. No. 98-8122-C1V-RYSKAMP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11345, at *12-*13 (S.D. Fla.June
18, 1998).
216. Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001).
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can now add the Supreme Court's reassurance that the Supremacy
Clause can do what § 301 (a) cannot. Especially after Dastar, courts
should not, need not, and thus probably will not find that § 301 (a)
preempts all state law reverse passing off claims.
IV. THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
How will Dastar shape copyright preemption doctrine in coming
years? At the very least, courts considering the preemption of state
reverse passing off claims will continue to seize on the case as a sim-
pler and more authoritative alternative to § 301 (a) of the Copyright
Act. Courts have already done so in several instances. It also looks
likely that courts applying the broad principles of Dastar to state re-
verse passing off claims will, consciously or not, expand the reach of
copyright preemption beyond the limits of § 301(a). That trend, too,
arguably has begun. Farther into the future, after citing Dastar to pre-
empt state reverse passing off claims has become commonplace,
courts may begin applying the case to preempt other types of state law
claims. In that event, Dastar will lead to the preemption of state law
claims that escape the reach of § 301(a), but nonetheless impermissi-
bly conflict with federal copyright law. This Part explains each of
those predictions, in turn.
Courts will almost certainly continue the practice, already evident
in the case law,217 of relying on Dastar rather than § 301 (a) to resolve
difficult questions about the preemption of state reverse passing off
claims. Applying § 301 (a), especially its "extra element" test, poses a
notoriously difficult problem, as anyone who has tried to wade
through the meandering case law on § 301 (a) can vouchsafe.2 18 Das-
tar offers courts an authoritative yet simple way around that problem.
The Aagard opinion gives ready proof of how and why courts grap-
pling with copyright preemption doctrine might abandon § 301 (a)
for Dastar.219 Tackling the question of whether or not to preempt a
217. See supra Part I.B.
218. As one such person, I am quite happy to testify to that claim. But, should addi-
tional proofs be required, see, e.g., Ashley D. Hayes, Note, The Right of Publicity and Protec-
tion of Personas: Preemption Not Required, 51 SYRACUSE L. REy. 1049, 1067 (2001) ("Although
section 301 of the Copyright Act was intended to alleviate the confusion regarding preemp-
tion analysis that existed prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, it has not met this intended
purpose."); Shelley Ross Saxer, Note, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Players Association: The Right of Publicity in Game Performances and Federal Copyright Preemp-
tion, 36 UCLA L. REv. 861, 878 (1989) ("Determining whether a state right is equivalent to
any of the rights protected by the federal copyright statute is one of the most difficult
aspects of analyzing federal copyright preemption.").
219. Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
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state law reverse passing off claim, the Aagard court initially framed
the issue in terms of § 301 (a) .220 As detailed above, however, the
court botched that attempt and, intentionally or not, abandoned
§ 301 (a) to resolve the matter solely in reliance on Dastar.221 Other
courts applying Dastar to decide state law reverse passing off claims
have not even bothered citing § 301(a). 2 Future courts will not only
face the same easy choice between § 301 (a) and Dastar, they will also
increasingly find that they can rely on earlier courts in choosing the
latter.
We should thus expect to see courts habitually decide the pre-
emption of state law reverse passing off claims by light of Dastar and its
lower court progeny, rather than § 301 (a). It furthermore looks likely
that, as a consequence, courts will expand copyright preemption doc-
trine beyond the confines of § 301(a). That statutory provision, re-
call, aims at barring state law rights that "are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights" afforded by copyright law.223 The Dastar Court, in
contrast, barred the unfair competition claim before it for interfering
with copyright policy, not for duplicating copyright law rights. 22 4 Das-
tar thus offers nothing like the sort of "extra elements" inquiry that
courts applying § 301 (a) routinely engage in.225 As courts increas-
ingly turn to the Dastar line of cases, rather than to § 301 (a), in resolv-
ing preemption questions, they will decreasingly ask whether a state
law claim is equivalent to, or has the same elements as, a copyright law
claim. Rather, following Dastar's lead, courts will ask whether a sus-
pect state law claim threatens to conflict with federal copyright policy.
Will that mark an improvement in copyright law or, more impor-
tantly, in intellectual property law as a whole? I doubt it. The notori-
ous vagaries of Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats show that implied
conflicts preemption hardly offers bright prospects for the rule of law.
Granted, § 301 (a) has won deserved criticism for likewise casting im-
penetrable shadows. But by way of their "extra element" gloss, courts
eventually interpreted § 301 (a) so as to mark off broad categories of
state law as plainly beyond the threat of preemption.226 Case law in-
220. Id. at 1216.
221. See supra Part I.B.4.
222. E.g., Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill.
2004); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-07189, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21194 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d
1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
224. See supra Part I.A.
225. See supra Part III.
226. See supra Part III.
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terpreting implied conflict copyright preemption would not offer
equally sharp (or, more properly, would not offer any less fuzzy)
boundaries for years, at best. Such reflections lead me to conclude
that the last and greatest surprise to issue from Dastar, that wildcard of
a case, may well prove its most unwelcome one.
CONCLUSION
Dastar offers a wealth of surprises. What started out looking like a
well intentioned, tightly reasoned, and modestly limited little case has,
in only a few years, grown into an intellectual property powerhouse.
On its face, Dastar merely bars federal unfair competition claims alleg-
ing the reverse passing off of goods communicating formerly copy-
righted material. In application, however, Dastar has come to bar
federal or state unfair competition claims that allege the reverse pass-
ing off of goods or services communicating formerly-copyrighted, still-
copyrighted, uncopyrightable, or trade secret-protected material. In brief,
Dastar now negates almost any complaint that a law of the United
States limits the misattribution of intellectual property.
That phenomenon alone would merit attention. But Dastar con-
ceals yet another, related, and bigger surprise. The functional equiva-
lence between federal and state unfair competition claims means that
case's policy arguments apply to the latter as well as the former.
Courts have thus quite sensibly cited Dastar as justification for barring
state law reverse passing off claims. The legal differences between re-
verse passing off and copyright claims, however, means that Dastar
cannot derive its power to preempt state reverse passing off claims
from § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act. A reverse passing claim has "ex-
tra elements" that distinguish it from a copyright claim and, thus, im-
munize a state reverse passing off claim from express preemption
under § 301 (a). Only the long-moribund and ill-defined doctrine of
implied preemption can explain Dastar's power over state reverse pass-
ing off claims. That looks like Dastars most worrisome, and most mis-
understimated, legacy.
The Dastar Court probably did not expect that lower courts would
apply its opinion to so broad a range of unfair competition claims.
Everyone, it seems, misunderestimated the case on that count. We
now have a better understanding of what Dastar means. We can thus
estimate that it may well soon expand from copyright to patent law.
We can also foresee-and can hardly fail to overestimate-Dastar's im-
pending collision with copyright preemption doctrine.
20061
